Power in the Philippines: How Democratic is Asia's"First Democracy"?

Reprinted from Journal of Asian and African Studies">

 

Power in the Philippines: How Democratic is Asia's"First Democracy"?

Reprinted from Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol.6, No. 3-4 (July and October 1971), 205-16, by permission of Brill Academic Publishers, Leiden, The Netherlands.

(It is intriguing to read this article -- researched in the Southeast-Asia section of the Yale University library at the end of the 1960's -- in light of the subsequent course of Philippine history.)

KEY TERMS

Philippine politics -- power elites -- social change -- sources of power -- family dynasties -- the unified elite

THE PROBLEM

To what extent does the power elite in the Philippines represent a relatively closed and self-perpetuating social class? On the surface, the Philippine polity presents us with an intriguing paradox. On the one hand, we are confronted with the almost unanimous opinion of social scientists, both native and foreign, that the country's political leadership is reactionary, greedy and corrupt on a scale seldom equaled. On the other hand, we hear of the intelligence, urbanity and humanity of the individual Filipino political leader, and we are told of the extremely high occupational prestige enjoyed by politicians in Philippine society (Tiryakian, 1956: 123).

Could the answer to these apparent contradictions lie in the traditionally stratified or "class" nature of that Philippine society and of its power elite as well -- a situation, if not created, at least strengthened and perpetuated by past and present colonial relationships? And if this is indeed the case, what are the implications for future social change in the Philippines?

The problem with which this study concerns itself is hardly novel nor unique; rather, it is as old as is the interest of sociologists in politics. Raymond Aron reduces it to the following question, "What is the relation between social differentiation and political hierarchy?" (Aron, 1966: 51) and recommends a method of analysis for dealing with the question which combines insights from the Marxist theory of class struggle and the "elitism" of the Pareto school. Aron maintains that crucial to the understanding of any society is the structure of its elite. By this he means "the relationship between the groups exercising power, the degree of unity or division between these groups, the system of recruiting the elite, and the ease or difficulty of entering it" (Aron, 1966:99).

A unified elite, says Aron, means the end of freedom. Although Aron sees the unified elite as developing only in the communist type of situation, it could conceivably tend to occur in any society where social power has been monopolized by one ruling class -- whether that class be the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, or the "scientific technostructure" (Galbraith, 1967:82). To that class belong the holders of the positions of authority in the upper hierarchy of all of the society's organizational complexes; and from that class the ruling group emerges a cohesive, interdependent and interrelated entity, subject to little or no competition from countervailing centers of power. It is this type of group that C. Wright Mills labeled "the power elite" (Mills, 1956: 147). Because they represent the most powerful economic interests, one of the major sources of social power -- control over the community's resources -- is theirs to command. Formal organization, another primary source of social power, becomes almost their sole prerogative in a non-industrial society. All that remains of the three sources of social power discussed by Robert Bierstedt in his thoughtful analysis (Bierstedt, 1950:734) is the mere potential for power (through ultimate resort to violence) that resides in majorities, or sheer numbers of unorganized people (Arendt, 1968).

The situation just described, that of the unified elite, is only one of a number of possible relationships between the political leadership, or elite, and the larger society. Tom Bottomore recommends the use of a three-fold system of "ideal type" societies to assess and analyze these same aspects of the relationship of rulers to ruled with which Aron is concerned. Bottomore lists these as: societies in which there is a ruling class, and elites which represent no more than particular aspects of its interests; societies in which there is no ruling class, but an elite which founds its power upon control of the bureaucracy or upon military force; and societies in which there exists a multiplicity of elites among which no cohesive and enduring group of powerful individuals or families seems to be discoverable (Bottomore, 1964:38).

This study has attempted to move in the direction suggested by Bottomore, in seeking to ascertain the class nature of the governing group in the Philippines and its relation to the larger society. For this purpose it was decided to focus on the Senate -- the senior legislative body. Admittedly, this choice may have introduced a measure of bias into the analysis, as two recent studies of Filipino legislators located some slight differences in background characteristics between members of the two houses of Congress (Abueva, 1965:10-29 and Stauffer, 1966). However, in every political system one of the governing bodies in the formal structure serves as the arena for the really decisive struggles for power. Indications are that in the Philippines it is the Senate which functions in this way, and is consequently the base of the most powerful of the elite. It is into the Senate that the most successful of the congressmen eventually move; it is from the Senate that the president and his running mate are customarily drawn.

Data were gathered on the membership of the 1931 and 1967 senates, and a comparison of the two were attempted. Six categories of information were sought: education and profession; family connections; business connections; income level; political background; and previous experience in high level administration. It was thought that only by close attention to all of these would it be possible to determine both the class component of the group and the degree to which monopolization of the powerful sectors of society has occurred. A considerable number of biographical sources were utilized, as well as back issues of the Manila Times and the Philippine Free Press from 1926 to 1969.1

The year 1931 was chosen as a point of comparison because it marked the last election before the adoption of the constitution which brought the Commonwealth into being, and the termination of the Jones Act experiment in semi-autonomous government. It was also fifteen years before Independence. The 1967 senate, on the other hand, was elected approximately twenty years after the Republic was formed in 1946. Between these two dates revolutionary changes had shaken the world, and the Philippines itself had undergone occupation by conquering armies as well as a change in status from colony to nation state. In the light of all this, the question of what changes had occurred during this period in the structure of the Filipino power elite becomes particularly interesting.

THE FINDINGS

Of immediate interest is the fact that 18 of the 24 salons elected in 1931 were lawyers, while 19 of the 1967 group were qualified to practice law. The phenomenon of the "lawyer politician" on the Philippine scene has intrigued many observers, including the Japanese scholars who studied the political situation there during the Occupation (Masamichi and Tatsuji, 1967:78). General opinion has been that the dominance of the lawyer in politics is on the wane. The present study fails to corroborate this; on the other hand, in spite of the slight increase in the proportion of lawyer members, there is in fact a greater variety of professions and occupations represented in the elite today, with a number of the 1967 group listed as having a third occupation in addition to law and politics. There are fewer plantation owners in the 1967 Senate (six in 1931 and only two today) but more academics (eight today, compared to one in 1931). The decrease in the landowning gentry, however, is more than compensated for by the almost threefold increase in the proportion of members now pursuing business as a second or third vocation.

More than 2/3 of the 1967 sample are of urban origin (over half of these being from Manila) while in 1931 only 8% came from Manila, with most of the remainder residing in small cities or towns in the provinces. There was no representative from a barrio in 1931, and only one in 1967. Furthermore, the latter, although perhaps justified in claiming barrio origin, was actually the son of a municipal councillor. Two members of the 1931 Senate, described by official biographers as having "humble" backgrounds, were Manuel Quezon who came from a small town, and Elpidio Quirino whose father was a provincial prison warden and whose mother was a college graduate. What one can infer from these official and exaggerated descriptions of humble origin is that these two were exceptions in that they were not members of the "ilustrado" class. However, they married into it.

Over 90% of the members of the 1931 Senate belonged to the traditional landed gentry (or ilustrado class) if one includes the Sultan of Sulu as upper class. For 1967 it is more difficult to designate class membership, as a number of powerful commercial and business dynasties, such as the Puyat family, have emerged, and edged some of the old plantation owners out of top position. Abueva (1965:13) assigns 74% of the Senate at that time to upper or upper middle class membership according to John Carroll's criteria for socio-economic class (Carroll, 1955). As for ethnic origin, one can only judge as best one can by the family names of the members. In the 1931 Senate, two of the names are probably of Tagolog origin, and of course we have Jamalul Kiram, Moslem Sultan of Sulu. The remaining 21 are Spanish names, probably representing families of Spanish Mestizo origin. Abueva designated 70% of the 1962 salons as being of Mestizo origin.

The pattern of mobility for the 1931 sample seems to be from an ilustrado class base into a liberal arts university program (in Manila or abroad) to graduation as a lawyer, and from there into politics. A close examination of the 1967 sample provides us with an illuminating comparison. No less than eight of the fathers of the salons in question were themselves high-ranking politicians or top administrators; thirteen of the fathers were at least well established in politics; and sixteen of the salons have members of their immediate family in a high-level business capacity. The Reyes family, influential in Philippine society and politics during the first two decades of the century and only recently beginning to re-enter the political arena, is particularly interesting in this regard. The Reyes -- an extremely wealthy and socially prominent family controlling widespread and diverse agricultural and manufacturing business enterprises -- provided wives over the years for Manuel Quezon, Claro Recto, Leonardo Perez, and Jovita Salonga. Advantageous marital unions have been customary among the younger salons in the 1967 sample as well. Gerardo Roxas, Ferdinand Marcos (the present chief of state), Sergio Osmena Jr., and Genaro Magsaysay, to name a few, have all married into multimillionaire families.

Another interesting feature of the bilateral family structure of the elite is the rather common occurrence of husband-wife teams in politics. We have Tecla San Andres Ziga in the Senate and her husband Venancio in the House. We have Magnolio Antonino stepping into her husband's shoes in the Senate, and Eva Kalaw, whose husband Teodoro is also in politics, and whose sister-in-law, Marie Kalaw Catigbank, has just stepped down from the Senate herself. One of the two most prominent intellectual leaders of the former era of Philippine politics, Dean Kalaw, was the father of Teodoro and Marie. His famous peer, Dean Benitez, was the father of Helena Benitez, another member of our 1967 sample.

Where business connections are concerned, the data for 1931 are rather incomplete. There was seemingly much less control of business by the solons in that period, with export agriculture being the major economic interest represented. Among the 1967 group the business interests are much more diverse and pervasive. At least two (Antonino and Almendras) have acquired great wealth through logging and lumbering enterprises, both in Mindanao, and both since World War II. Aquino Jr., Diokno, Puyat, Perez and Osmena Jr. -- all powerful business magnates -- have interests in real estate, finance, shipping, manufacturing, and mass communications media. Regarding the latter, Vandenbosch and Butwell have this to say:

"They... [big business interests] dominate the two main parties.... They also dominate the process of formal political communications, controlling the nationally circulated Manila newspapers, TV stations, and the country-wide radio networks. These communications moguls frequently clash with one another but rarely, if ever, on ideological grounds... [they] belong to the same elite... an elite that endeavours to perpetuate its power and resulting pleasures " (Vandenbosch and Butwell, 1967: 143).

Sergio Osmena Jr. is an interesting example of the economic power wielded by these figures. His father, a member of the ilustrado class, was one of the two greatest powers in Filipino politics for almost half a century. His mother was a Veloso -- another leading political family of the same class. Sergio Jr. married into the de la Rama family (one of the biggest names in shipping). It would be difficult to exaggerate the power that this man wields, not only in Cebu city (much of which he owns both figuratively and literally) but in the nation as a whole.

No data on income were available for the 1931 sample. For the 1967 group, however, figures were obtained for gross income as declared by the winning Senatorial candidates for the 1963, 1965, and 1967 elections. These are probably underestimated, but are no doubt indicative of a general pattern. The incomes are listed in pesos as follows:

1. Almendras -- 527,838.00
2. Antonino (paid one-half million in income tax -- no record of gross income)
3. Aquino Jr. -- 301,023.00
4. Aytona -- 111,075.00
5. Benitez -- 26,034.00
6. Diokno -- 166,090.00
7. Ganzon -- 42,200.00
8. Kalaw -- 347,222.00
9. Lagumbay -- 37,500.00
10. Laurel -- 104,286.00
11. Liwag -- 103,000.00
12. Magsaysay -- 23,000.00
13. Osmena Jr. -- 529,024.00
14. Padilla -- 464,944.00
15. Pelaez -- 161,541.00
16. Perez -- 25,433.00
17. Puyat -- 130,041.00
18. Roxas -- 43,493.00
19. Roy -- 56,700.00
20. Salonga -- 34,512.00
21. Tanada -- 157,974.00
22. Teves -- 54,633.00
23. Tolentino -- 53,953.00
24. Ziga -- 26,600.00

A conservative estimate of the average annual income of the 24 salons would be 150,000 pesos. (During the years for which these statements were made the exchange rate was two pesos to the dollar.)

In addition, the salons received a salary of about 7,200 pesos in 1962, and additional allowances for a blanket expense account which Abueva estimated at about 35,000 pesos per person per year. In order to see this in perspective, one needs to realize that the average per-capita income for the Philippines for that same period was approximately 100 pesos (Myrdal, 1968:535). Today, over 69% of the nation's families are still earning less than 2,500 pesos a year. Only 2.6% of the family incomes are in the 10,000 peso bracket or higher (Editors, Philippine Progress, 1968; 1-8) .

An examination of political background reveals a definite pattern of movement up through the various levels of elective offices: from municipal councillor and/or city mayor; to the House; to the Senate; and ultimately (for a few) to the position of vice president and president. Although Stauffer, in his 1966 study, concluded that this pattern is less true for senators today than previously, the present study did not indicate this.

In both the 1931 and 1967 senates, there is a surprisingly high incidence of previous experience in high-level appointive positions in government. There is evidence of extensive movement back and forth between appointive administrative and elective legislative positions. A common example of this is the apparently easy interchangeability of senatorships and judgeships. Another occurrence noted is the simultaneous holding of positions in both cabinet and senate, and the extremely common habit of salons holding memberships on boards of government corporations, and even frequently performing top management roles in these. If there is a difference between the 1931 and 1967 situation it is that there is much more of this behavioral pattern in existence today. Also, there is an increase in the variety and in the more economic nature of the interlocking posts held. (Examples are Senator Gil Puyat, formerly on the crucial Economic Planning Board, and Dominador Aytona -- moving directly into the Senate from the position of Budget Commissioner.)

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

On the whole, the evidence collected during the course of this study indicates that the Philippine elite displays a remarkable consistency and continuity over time. This is no doubt due to the fact that it is an elite of families rather than of individuals, and is therefore a true upper class in the pre-modern sense, rather than a functionally specific grouping. This "pre-modern" aspect of the entire Filipino political scene is recognized by Lande in his informative works on the subject (Lance, Monograph Series 6, 1967). But why this perpetuation of a ruling class comprising powerful family dynasties? What mechanisms have been operative in Philippine society to produce a community topped by an upper strata so firmly ensconced? A cursory expedition back into the history of the region might prove enlightening.

When Magellan stumbled on to the Philippines in the sixteenth century, he found a people already highly organized into status groupings. This fact seems often to have been overlooked by historians in their emphasis on the lack of any overall political, economic, or religious organization. True, the villages were small and not integrated into any larger entity, but at the local or community level the population was extensively organized for both economic and political purposes into an hierarchical authority and status structure, with the family as the basic unit. Corpuz mentions that the "barangay" (community) was essentially a group of extended families, and that it proved to be a very durable institution (Corpuz, 1965:23). In another book the same author explains in detail the nature of the social organization in these barangays (Corpuz, 1957:2). He identifies three classes of families: that of the chief, or "datu"; those of freeman ("timaguas"); and those who made up the servile classes. The latter were of two types -- the "namamahoys", or serfs, and the "saguiguilirs", or slaves. Corpus emphasizes that always it was the family that was the significant unit. He also refers to the presence of a high degree of differentiation in judicial roles -- an interesting point in the light of what can only be seen as a disproportionate sophistication in this area in comparison to development in other institutional areas during the modern period.

The stratified nature of the society just described would hold slight importance for us if it had all been swept away by the Spanish conquest, as might have been expected. But Phelan writes, "On the contrary, colonial society provided the chieftains with additional means of enrichment...they retained both their wealth and their local political power (Phelan, 1959,157).

What happened was that, when the Spaniards reorganized the Filipinos into "pueblos" and provinces, they merely brought in the old barangays with their social structure intact. The datu, with his position hereditary as before (but considerably strengthened), became the top native administrative functionary for the colonial regime. In return for his services he and his family were exempted from paying to Spain the very tribute that it became his responsibility to collect from his inferiors. He was known as the "cabeza". These cabezas throughout the colony gradually became established as the "principalia", or local aristocracy. This aristocracy, over time, intermingled with the Spaniards and certain influential Chinese families who had obtained plantation-sized tracts of land from the Spanish king. What had evolved by the late nineteenth century was an ilustrado class of powerful families who had accumulated fortunes as landlords of large estates. When the Enlightenment began to reach the Philippines it was this group of families who monopolized opportunities for advancement through education; just as earlier, they had monopolized the fruits of whatever economic progress had occurred (Corpuz, 1965: 28). And it was mainly from this group that there emerged in the late nineteenth century, a species of would-be revolutionary to challenge the administration imposed by Spain.

With the arrival of the Americans, however, the revolutionary movement as represented by figures such as Rizal, Bonifacio and Aguinaldo was rapidly terminated. Important positions in the military government established in 1901 were given to the Filipino ilustrados. Among these was the surviving nationalist, Aguinaldo, who had come to the fore during the last years of the Spanish reign. In the words of Corpuz, "Already the privileged and property-owning class in Filipino society, they now became entrenched, by way of their new positions, into the high political status that they were to enjoy for years to come" (Corpuz, 1965; 66).

The Independence movement had been nipped in the bud by the imposition of a new colonial authority wise enough to assimilate and utilize the native elite. The Americans almost immediately set about putting into operation a system of self government at the local level. This was no doubt due primarily to American commitment to egalitarian ideals, coupled with an honest reluctance on the part of Democrats at home to admit to long-term imperialistic motives. The Japanese scholars, Royama Masamichi and Takeuchi Tatsuji, in an intriguing report on the Philippine polity produced during the Occupation, attribute this move to other motives as well (Masamichi and Tatsuji, 1967:70). They say that, because both the integration of the various racial groupings and progress toward national unification were still in their infancy in the Philippines, it seemed sound and expedient (from the standpoint of political technology) to begin the democratic process at the local level and work upwards. Also, "Americans, in tackling the power of the Church as a political institution, found no better strategy than to attack directly its stronghold, the local government, where the friars were entrenched in influence and power" (Masamichi, 1967: 71).

But the Church was not the only institution entrenched at the local level in a position of great influence and (potential) power. Corpuz, in a number of passages in his books, explains how the Filipinos had, over the centuries, turned away from the repressive, Spanish controlled government and toward the family as the sole source of security. Furthermore, a symbiotic relationship had developed between the tenant and servile families and those kinship groupings at the top of the social structure which controlled the welfare of the latter. The network of powerful family and dependency ties in the provinces therefore offered a ready-made political machine. Corpuz claims that, from the very beginning, it was the family that used the political party as its instrument, for the fulfilment of its needs, rather than vice versa. The party politicians were representatives of ilustrado families who viewed the party only as a means of acquiring political power. Lande claims that "political parties in the Philippine Congress would have to be designated as almost exclusively alignments for the capture of power, the alignments that promote public policies . . . are not parties but legislative blocs. . . " (Lance: 1967: 106). And, on the basis of the evidence in this study alone, one would be forced to suspect that these blocs are in reality groups of bilaterally extended families, whose interests their representatives are duty-bound to serve. That the politicians have served these interests handsomely can be attested by a look at the economic policies of the Filipino government over the years. Semana, writing in 1967, shows how even the free-trade policies which had the effect of rendering the Filipinos ever more dependent on the U.S. economically, were initiated and supported by plantation-owning legislators because this situation was extremely lucrative for these agricultural exporters (Semana, 1967 :27) .

Mary Hollnsteiner has produced an illuminating case study of the process by means of which the party system merely provided the formal structure within which firmly established family dynasties could grapple for power at the local level (Hollnsteiner, 1960:111-131). And as the legislature gradually assumed more and more power at the national level, these top members of the ilustrado class in the rural areas moved up through the political system (and into Manila) to coalesce at the top, ultimately as salons. The party politician remained such in name (and game) only -- in reality he was a member of the feudal landed gentry. And the interests he brought into the political arena with him were not the long-term interests of the larger society, but the immediate ones of his extended family.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

During the years following 1931 the Filipino legislature has been gaining more and more control of the national decision-making process. However, one is forced sadly to conclude that the increasing dominance of the legislature has not benefitted the larger society, but merely the class whose representatives control both Houses. In fact, the Philippine political situation seems to be a rather striking example of Bottomore's first "ideal type" society, in which power elites merely represent the various interests of the ruling class. But why is it that the democratization of the electoral base, which has proceeded apace since 1931, has not resulted in a more representative ruling elite? Or why, at least, has it not effected the birth of a new brand of reform politician who might be expected to challenge the monopolization of power by the ruling families? (It is true that one aspect of the Filipino political ritual has long been the formal role of an opposition member known as "fiscalizer", but the individual who performs this in a very dramatic -- although invariably ineffectual -- way has typically been a prestigious insider such as the late Claro Recto, or today's young Benigno Aquino Jr.) What seems to have been occurring since 1931, rather than any real challenge to the status quo by sincere, reform-minded representatives of the people, is a consolidation of the power of these ruling families by means of their gradual acquisition of top positions in the upper reaches of the other institutional sectors such as the economy, the bureaucracy, and the intelligentsia. Neither organized labor nor the military (possible channels of mobility for the underprivileged, and complexes of great power in many societies) have appeared as significant political forces. And as for the Catholic Church, its powerful economic position is clear, but apparently whatever political power it commands is wielded indirectly -- again, through the elite families.

How is one justified in saying that it is the elite family rather than the party that is the significant unit of political organization and therefore the locus of power in the Philippines? In the first place, there is substantial agreement among students of Filipino politics as to the lack of any real difference between the Liberal and Nacionalista parties, regarding ideology, policy, or even the membership and support of particular families. Individuals pass freely back and forth between parties as their interests move them. And this habit is not restricted to the lower ranks of party members. Ramon Magsaysay left the Liberal party in 1952 to become Nacionalista candidate for president against his former boss, President Quirino. Emmanuel Pelaez, vice president from 1961 to 1965, changed parties in mid-term and joined Macapagal's opposition. But Macapagal, in his turn, had been Liberal vice president under Nacionalista President Garcia, and he spent his entire four-year term in office campaigning against his superior. And then, again, in 1964, the current President, Ferdinand Marcos, defected from the Liberal to the Nacionalista party in order to get their nomination for 1965, to run against Macapagal. To complete the con-fusion, Marcos' running mate (Vice President Fernando Lopez) was Liberal vice president for the Quirino administration of 1949-53.

All this merely serves to demonstrate that it is not parties that matter, but the wealthy and influential families now in control of the top positions in government, civil service, academia, and the economy. In fact, Corpuz notes that it is common for these families to "take out insurance against the vicissitudes and perils of politics by dividing their affiliation and support between the two leading parties" (Corpuz, 1965:103). Thus this elite, because of tight, interlocking family connections, is uniquely capable of closing ranks and protecting itself, and in this endeavour, the party system has been made to serve it well.

It is abundantly clear that the interests of the workers, tenant farmers and unemployed are insufficiently represented in the Filipino power elite. It is clear, also, that this elite has developed into a dangerously unified "family compact" with a narrow range of economic and social interests. This means that the sphere in which the real struggle for political power takes place is becoming ever more limited. If this trend continues there is a very real danger that ultimate power and authority will finally coalesce in the hands of a dictatorial minority. In this direction lies the fascist state. Or, alternatively, the situation of social injustice and economic exploitation may become so unbearable that the lower classes will rise up in revolution, overthrow the regime, and attempt to establish a classless society through civil war. Here again, however, a minority must eventually grasp the reins of executive authority, and the danger of abuse of power is great in any situation where the masses are unorganized and undifferentiated -- and the bonds of community have been torn asunder. In such a case the drift could be toward the Stalinist state.

Three factors in the present situation appear hopeful, however. These are the continuing expansion of the electoral base, the rapid extension of elementary education to the masses, and the (slowly) increasing productivity of the economy. Unfortunately the favorable impact of the latter is offset by an accelerating rate of population growth and by the tendency of the elite to monopolize a disproportionate share of the increase. In addition, Semana shows how the very unified nature of the elite, which this study has documented, has been a serious obstacle to economic development in the Philippines (Semana, 1967 :27). (Semana does not use the term, "unified elite", but merely refers to current political behavior -- especially the growing strength of the legislature.)

The Philippine political situation today could be characterized as one of near-dictatorship by a unified, elitist legislature. However, there have been indications since the Magsaysay period that the executive office is recognizing the significance of the potential for a power base now existing within the larger community. As education and political mobilization of the population increases, the power of the executive branch of government may temporarily increase as well, in relation to that of the elitist legislature. In that way, some effective alteration in the distribution of rewards may be possible through positive government controls such as those advocated by Gunnar Myrdal for South Asia (Myrdal, 1968: 2077-2108). If this happens, and if the country is fortunate in the calibre of political leadership thrust to the top of its elite, the Philippines may yet develop into a successful democracy. But the rise of Magsaysay was a wartime accident. The mechanisms of mobility now present in the structure operate as powerful screening devices to prevent the ascent of revolutionary or even reformist leaders through legitimate channels. And the time remaining for peaceful reform may be all too short.

REFERENCES

ABUEVA, Jose V. 1965. "Social Backgrounds and Recruitment of Legislators and Administrators in the Philippines." Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 9: 10-29.

ARENDT, Hanna. 1968. "Violence and Revolution." Lecture at Yale University. ARON, Raymond. 1966. "Social Structure and Ruling Class."in Lewis A. Coser (ed.), Political Sociology. New York: Harper and Row, 51.

BIERSTEDT, Robert. 1950. "An Analysis of Social Power." American Sociological Review, 15:730-38.

BOTTOMORE, T. 1964. Elites and Society. New York: Basic Books.

CARROLL. John J. 1955. The Philippine Manufacturing Entrepreneur: Agent and Product of Change. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

CORPUZ, Onofre D. 1957. The Bureaucracy of the Philippines. Manila: Institute of Public Administration.

--------------------------.1965. The Philippines. Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

GALBRAITH, John K. 1967. The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. HOLLNSTEINER, Mary R. 1960 "The Development of Political Parties on the Local Level: A Social Anthropological Case Study of Huly Municipality, Bulacan." Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 4: 111-31.

LANDE, Carl H. 1966. Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics. Monograph Series No. 6, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University. MASAMICHI, Royama and TAKEUCHT Tatsuji. 1967. The Philippine Polity; A Japanese View. Monograph Series 12, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University.

MILLS, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. New Jersey: Oxford University Press. MYRDAL, Gunnar. 1968. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Pantheon.

PHELAN, John Leddy. 1959. The Hispanization of the Philippines. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Philippine Progress, (unsigned editorial). 1968 "Statistics on Philippine Family Income." (April) 7-9.

SEMANA, Caridad C. 1967 "Philippine Politics and Economic Development." Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 11: 21-28.

STAUFFER, Robert B. 1966 "Philippine Legislators and their Changing Universe." Journal of Politics. (August)

TIRYAKIAN, Edward. 1956. The Evaluation of Occupations in an Underdeveloped Country: The Philippines. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University.

NOTE

I.Major sources utilized for data gathering were as follows: Agbayani, Amefil, "Indices of Change: The Philippine Senate", Philippine Journal ofPublic Administration, Vol. 11, No. I (January 1967),13-23; Alip, Eufronio M., (ed.), The Philippino Presidents, Manilla: Alip and Sons, Inc., 1958; Directory, Catalogue of Philippine Manufacturers and Producers, 1964; Fifty Years of Philippine Autonomy, Philippine Historical Association, R. P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1966; Guzman, Jovita et.al., Women of Distinction, Manilla, 1967; The Manilla Times, November 1963, 1965 and 1967; Meadows, Martin, "Philippine Political Parties and the 1961 Election", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Fall 1962), 261-74; Milne, R. S., "From Magsaysay to Macapagal", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Autumn 1962), 511-18; The Philippine Free Press (relevant issues from 1926 - 1968); Philippine Government Elective Officials, Manilla: URERA Enterprises, 1964; Statistical Handbook of the Philippines, Manila: Philippine Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1965; Stauffer, Robert B., op. cit.; The Philippines Who's, (eds.), Soriano and Refizos, Manilla, 1957.